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Abstract: This paper gives a stipulative definition of social design. It argues that there
is a distinctive field of design practice, and design practice research that can be labelled
‘social design’ but that this distinctiveness cannot be spelled out directly in terms of
the relation between design and the social, which has been the dominant view up till
now. Rather, social design is defined in terms of the kind of knowledge production that
it is – as a form of situational normative inquiry. This means that it is conducted
empirically by responding to problems identified in specific situations and according to
the ends-in-view that can be collectively warranted, and thus responding to the norms
of justification and standards of criticism of those affected. This stipulative definition
not only has the advantage of delineating and orienting the fields of practices of social
design, it also opens some interesting considerations with respect to knowledge claims
made by social design research.
Keywords: social design, normative, inquiry, knowledge

1. Introduction
Setting aside the sweeping generalisation that all designing is social in as much as it
intervenes into social worlds (Dilnot, 1982), no unitary definitional basis for social design has
been proposed. Social design has been used as an umbrella term to span such diverse names
as: William Morris, Walter Gropius, Buckminster Fuller, through Victor Papanek, to Richard
Buchanan, John Thackara, Nigel Whiteley and Bruce Mau, more recently, Victor Margolin,
Enzio Manzini and Alastair Fuad-Luke (Melles, et al., 2011; Gamman & Thorpe, 2011; Chen et
al., 2016; Resnick, 2019). It has also been deployed more narrowly to indicate interest in
specific ‘social topics’ such as sustainability (Ceschin & Gaziulusoy, 2016) and social justice
(Costanza-Chock, 2020). The meaning remains disputed (e.g., Chen, et al., 2016; Julier, 2013)
and has now prompted a critical discussion of what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ use of the term
(Koskinen & Hush, 2016; Kimbell, 2020). All this against the backdrop of growing scepticism
about the usefulness of the term (Markussen, 2017; Tonkinwise, 2015).
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The paper makes an original contribution by offering a prism which can be used to identify
the instances of social designing against the backdrop of other forms of designing. The key
argument is that there is a distinctive field of design practice that can be labelled ‘social
design’ but that this distinctiveness cannot be spelled out directly in terms of the relation
between design and the social, which up till now has been the dominant line of inquiry
(Chen et al., 2016; Koskinen and Hush, 2016; Markussen, 2017, Kimbell, 2020). Rather, social
design is a form of situational normative inquiry. This means that it is conducted empirically
through engagement in situations and, more specifically, by responding to problems
identified in specific situations (Dewey, 1938; Clarke, et al., 2005). Being situated is this way
can be said to apply to many forms of designing, but only social design is normative.
Normative means that the inquiry responds to norms of justification and standards of
criticism (Wittgenstein, 1968; Williams, 1981; Radder, 1992). More explicitly, what makes an
inquiry normative is that it is performed with a view to improving existing situations with
ends-in-view that are collectively justified and collectively warranted (see explanations
below). Thus significantly, the claim is not that social design is based on some ‘right’ values
(cf. Friedman, et al., 2013) nor that some notion of the ‘right’ outcome can fix the meaning
of social design (cf. Papanek and Fuller, 1972). Rather, social design is defined by how actors
employ their practical judgements in problematic contexts, acting together and using the
materials at their disposal with a view to improving their current situation according to the
warranted ends in view.
This conceptualisation, as the paper shows, is indebted to Dewey’s notion of inquiry but
interpreted through some more recent perspectives in valuation studies (Lamont, 2012;
Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013; Stark, 2009), philosophy of information and epistemology more
broadly (Floridi, 2017; Ammon, 2017) and a field of sociology referred to as science and
technology studies, or more recently, science, technology and society studies (Latour, 2004;
Marres, 2007) – all this in conversation with design research (e.g., Daalsgard, 2014; Dixon,
2019; Molnar & Palmås, 2021). Conduced by mobilising these different discursive bodies,
this paper presents an outsider’s attempt to penetrate design practice research, rather than
offering what Vear recently dubbed an ‘in-vivo perspective’ (Vear, 2022) - an understanding
originating from within design research practice. This recourse to external perspectives can
be productive insofar as it gives access to new set of concepts, notably those in pragmatic
philosophy, philosophy of information and science and technology studies whose primary
preoccupation is knowledge production and epistemology. This approach can be productive
because not only does it eschew too easy a solution to fall on the notion of tacit knowing in
explaining the knowledge claims made through design (Niedderer, 2021); it also offers a way
of conducting analysis in a new way that does not reproduce the entrenched divides in
design research (e.g., the disputes concerning the limits of scientific and rationalistic thinking
in design and the role that artefacts and materiality play – see for instance, Forlizzi, et al.
(2009) vis-à-vis Gaver & Bowers (2012)).
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In terms of its structure, following an exposition of the key concepts used in the argument,
the paper offers a brief overview of the most relevant discussions bridging the key terms
identified and design research. These two sections provide a basis for setting out the
implications of the proposed argument for social design and knowledge production more
broadly. The paper closes with a summary and an outline of possible future research topics
and avenues.

2. Introducing the key terms of the argument
This section puts the foundation for the argument of this paper by introducing the
conceptual building blocks used. These need explaining because - imported, as they are,
from pragmatic philosophy and science and technology studies - they are technical terms
that are far from obvious. The following discussion explains thus what is meant by
situational inquiry, what is meant by normativity and the role of warranting in this,
extending the discussion to the notion of matters of concern and issue publics which are
helpful in explaining the specific notion of localised normativity which, this paper argues,
defines social design.

2.1 Situational inquiry
In its classical formulation taken from Dewey, an inquiry starts with an experience of an
indeterminate and problematic situation and it ‘ends’ with a transformation of a situation
into a determinate one. In the Theory of Inquiry, John Dewey defined inquiry as:
The controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that
is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the
elements of the original situation into a unified whole (Dewey, 1938 p. 108).

Indeterminacy arises in experience when the understanding of the situation as a foundation
for action cannot be achieved because there is a sense of incongruence and incoherence.
The resolution seeking characterising inquiry is sometimes cast in terms of a pattern of
Dewey’s six-step technique: 1. Identify the problem 2. Plan possible solutions 3. Evaluate
and test the various solutions 4. Decide on a mutually acceptable solution 5. Implement the
solution 6. Evaluate the solution. This is in some way misleading as resolving the issue
involves a certain back and forth: an exploration of what in one’s conception of the situation
matters for action, and what in action matters for the conception of the situation. Progress
and outcomes of an inquiry are ultimately determined in some observable real-world
consequences (Talisse, 2003; see also Cronen, 2001, p. 19). Thus, inquiry does not happen in
the head but in experience and through interaction with the material world. Indeed, what is
being negotiated are relevant understandings of facts and norms but also, the material
constraints of specific situations (see more in ‘Matters of concern’). Here Dewey speaks of
the need to transform indeterminate situations in naturalistic terms, as simply something
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that purposive organisms do. This however raises questions as to how actions are directed
and oriented.

2.2 Normativity and collective warranting
Dewey uses the term ends-in-view to describe these ‘foreseen consequences which
influence present deliberation’ (Dewey, 1930, p. 223) and emphasises that they are not
things lying outside of inquiry but something that arise and function within it. In other
words, they are part of the situation. They make it possible to ‘understand the actual in light
of the possible’ (Alexander, 1993, p. 371) and in this sense orient the inquiry. Importantly,
while Dewey notes that ends-in-view have to be understood in the context of an evolving
grammar of each situation, they are not by any means arbitrary (1925, p. 161). The setting of
the direction of inquiry is necessarily normative: is requires choosing which value
orientations are to be pursued and thus, judging some to be better than others. These
judgements can be wrong or right: either helping to resolve the problematic situation or
exacerbating difficulties. A different way to put this point is that they can be criticised and
justified. In the words of Hogan, ‘the problematic situation has a deeply normative character
[because it is primarily an action situation where] something must be done and there are
better and worse things we can do’ (Hogan, 2009, p. 286). As such, inquiry can be performed
with good or bad practical outcome. But how is the course of inquiry to be decided?
Dewey is adamant that social and cultural norms, what are sometimes referred to as
‘values’, are a necessary part of the process but they are not sufficient in explaining the
normative orientation of inquiry. They can shape ends-in-view but do not exhaust them, not
least because values held by individuals as well as the broader norms have to be situationally
renegotiated. A different way of putting this point is that value orientations have to be
situationally and intersubjectively warranted. To be warranted means to be shown right
through a collective, ongoing, self-correcting processes of inquiry which is necessarily
relational. To be warranted means to be agreed collectively and situationally demonstrated
to be right. Normativity in this sense is therefore generated from within situations. This in
turn raises the question of how expansive situations are – ‘what is in and what is out’ as
relevant in determining this localised understanding of normativity?

2.3 Matters of concern and issue publics
As Marres (2007) argues, Dewey had a ‘socio-ontological’ conception of situations when he
argues that ‘people’s involvement in politics [and issues more broadly] is mediated by
problems that affect them’ (2007, p. 759). Marres herself develops an understanding of how
situations in the context of political involvement are formed through participatory ways of
working around issues which affect people. This, Marres points out, links with a host of
considerations around ‘the performance of concerns’, establishing a link with Latour’s idea
of ‘matters of concern’ (Latour, 2004). Matters of concern are assemblages of ideas, agents
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and things which persist because they are linked through emotional and affective
commitments and material proximity. A different way to put this point, as Marres does, is
that ‘issues spark a public into being’ (2005) and emotional connections and material
contiguity make them persist.
Matters of concern (Latour, 2004) and issue publics (Marres, 2007) are useful when thinking
about normativity as evolving across situations. In simple terms, they offer a way of
connecting the ends-in-view, agency and materiality which are negotiated in each situation
when the value orientation is being set. Matters of concern can be said to be co-extensive
with the warranting networks relevant to the given situation. As such, they can be said to
offer a way of delineating the networks and objects relevant to the localised normativities in
each situation (Zuiderent-Jerak, 2015; Mol et al., 2015; Kaszynska, under review).
Alongside the Deweyan term of situational inquiry and the idea of achieving normativity
through warranting – the matters of concerns and issue publics are the key concepts
mobilised in this paper to define social design and to comment on the nature of knowledge
production through design more broadly.

3. Relevant discussions in the existing design literature
Needless to say, this is not the first time that Dewey’s thinking has been brought to bear on
design. Schön called for ‘new forms of scholarship (..) closer to practice’ that ‘proceed
through a design inquiry, in the Deweyan sense’ (1995, p.34). Buchanan evoked Dewey in
relation to the ‘integrations of knowledge that will combine theory with practice for new
productive purposes’ (Buchanan, 1992, p.6). Alas, there has been a renaissance of
pragmatism in design research in the recent years with a number of authors using Dewey as an
interpretative lens into design (e.g., Melles 2008; Dalsgaard 2014; Dixon 2019, 2020).

3.1 Explicitly Deweyan positions
In the context of this work, Deweyan inquiry is used predominantly to elucidate the process
of designing from the point of view of epistemology: the theory of knowing and knowledge
production. For instance, Melles suggests that inquiry could be understood as ‘design’s
natural epistemology’ (Melles 2008, p.5), Dalsgaard looks at inquiry as part of ‘a conceptual
scaffold for design thinking’ (Dalsgaard, 2014, p. 143) and Dixon discloses to be motivated by
wanting to understand ‘knowledge as contingent and ontologically transformative’ (Dixon,
2019, p.16). Though some of this work acknowledges the ethical implications of designing –
be it in relation to the demand for articulation of ‘more “enduring and extensive” values by
the research design community’ (Dixon, 2019, p.16) or the aspiration to unpack the
implications of inquiry for collective action (Dixon, et al., 2021) – normativity is not
considered in any systematic way in the context of this work. Nor are these authors
concerned with understanding social design specifically.
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3.2 Implicitly Deweyan positions
Outside of this self-proclaimed Deweyan strand in design research, other attempts to link
inquiry and design have been made against the backdrop of the growing dissatisfaction with
how the relationship between design and value has been conceptualised. In this context, an
interesting intervention by JafariNaimi, Nathan and Hargraves uses Dewey’s inquiry to
criticise an approach to understanding the role of values - aka norms - in the main stream
VSD (Value Sensitive Design) approaches (JafariNaimi, et al., 2015; see also Le Dantec et al.,
2009). In this context JafariNaimi et al. point out that ‘the static nature of value
classifications as well as the focus on values of ethical import, even though fulfilling a
heuristic role in VSD, does not allow for value discovery in the design process’ (p.92). To gain
a more accurate understanding, they suggest, values are to be used as ‘hypotheses’
developed though inquiry. Julier’s and Hodgson’s more recent call to see value as ‘multiple,
unstable, emergent and contingent’ (2021, p.96) and to account for this value with a new
approach articulated from within design - could be seen to support the argument for an
inquiry-based approach to understand value and values in design as situationally unfolding.
A Deweyan undertone also resonates in some nascent approaches with the ambition to
understand value of and in design through the lens of valuation practices (Whitham et al.,
2019; Molnar &Palmås, 2021; Kaszynska, submitted for publication). What these approaches
have in common is wanting to see value - and values - not as static nor universal but as
dynamic and contextually embedded, indeed as ‘performed’.

4. Implications for social design (and knowledge production more
broadly)
The thinking underpinning both – the explicitly and implicitly Deweyan - strands is brought
together in the context of the present paper. The central focus is however different. This
paper uses the specific understanding of normativity to define social design in ontological
terms – and so, with reference to matters of concern by seeing it as performed in specific
situations. This paper thus makes a distinctive and novel contribution by asking what it
means to take Dewey’s situational and normative inquiry to be ontologically constitutive of
social design.

4.1 Implications for social design
The implications of this are many and varied. The following are central from the point of
view of the present paper.
•

From assuming that the normativity constitutive of social design is empirical, it
follows that social design should be anchored in genuine problems that are
experienced in specific situations. In this sense, social design can be said to be
anchored in matters of concern that can be clearly identified by the affected
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stakeholders within the agreed boundaries and networks. This brings to the
foreground the questions of who is at the proverbial table and this makes
exclusions transparent (Dewey, 1938; Marres, 2007).
• From assuming that the normativity constitutive of social design is collectively
warranted, it follows that social design should be conducted in a way that
encourages deliberations and public resolution. A simple way to put this point is
that deliberation about ‘which purposes are advanced and why’ (Wicks &
Freeman, 1998, p. 129) and how the inquiry is directed - are subject to criticism
and approval by those who belong to the relevant situations. Here social design
might be seen to cross ways with political theory, democratic innovation and
other related endeavours aimed at articulating a way of co-ordinating action
based on collective decisions reached on the basis of public reasons (Bohman,
2004; see also Elstub & Escobar, 2019).
• From assuming that the normativity constitutive of social design is practical, it
follows that social design intervenes into and changes empirical situations in
ways that can be assessed as improvements or deteriorations by those affected.
Practical reason in the context of social design, and in a general sense, is
concerned with action and with the consequences of this action insofar as this is
the basis for action, and accounting for forms of ‘material participation’ (Marres,
2007). Accordingly, social design can be said to direct action and behavior in
ways that implement material changes in given situations according to the
situationally warranted ends-in-view (Anscombe, 1957; Brandom, 2001).
The points above, conjointly, can be used to distinguish instances of social designing from
those that are not. Notably, the approach is not prescriptive in the sense of fixing the right
values and the right process. In this sense, it is consonant with Pedersen’s call for ‘a more
pluralistic and descriptive understanding of […] how designers and relevant stakeholders in
actual practice work together’ (2016, p. 182). This in line with the ontological defining and
wanting to see design not in terms of what it is but how it is performed by those directly
affected.

4.2 Implications for knowledge production more broadly
While the objective of this paper is to focus on social design, it would be a missed
opportunity not to comment briefly on the implication this proposal has for thinking about
epistemic claims and knowledge production in design in general. In line with Dewey’s
assumptions that ‘valuations exist in fact and are capable of empirical observation so that
propositions about them are empirically verifiable’ (Dewey, 1939, p.189) – it could be argued
that the knowledge generation mechanism in social design applies to knowledge generation
in more general terms. Knowledge production in this sense is necessarily experientially
grounded in the relevant situations and it presupposes actual interaction across the given
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matter of concern. This understanding is in line with the proposal originating in the
philosophy of information which sees design in terms of the ‘maker’s knowledge’ and as ‘an
independent epistemic praxis through which one can acquire genuine ab anteriori
knowledge' (Floridi, 2017, p.508; see also Ammon, 2017). These perspectives challenge the
traditional epistemology which sees knowledge production in terms of producing accurate
representations, theories and models at a distance. In contrast, the interactive and
experiential standpoint presupposed here means that knowing ‘has to be performed’ (Antal,
et al., p. 2), to borrow a phrase recently made current in valuation studies.
Performance is at the bottom of the pragmatic action-based philosophy and could arguably
be said to underpin all design; what makes social design a special case of designing is that
the performance in question consists of normative warranting. It is in this sense that
normative inquiry is ontologically constitutive of social design. Thus, while it can be
suggested that the case of social design offers a productive basis for understanding
knowledge claims made in design in general, not all design is social design.

5. Concluding reflection and future opportunities
The paper brings different bodies of literature - including the philosophy of pragmatism and
of information, valuation studies, science, technology and society, and design research - in
order to contribute to an on-going but arguably stale debate concerning the meaning of
social design. This paper argues that inquiry – as normative – is central and fundamental to
understanding and defining social design. In social design the parties involved in situations
come together to articulate, negotiate and warrant the ends-in-view or how their
coordinated action is to be directed. Because this orientation is subject to criticism and
justification, it is normative in character: simply put, there can be good and bad orientations
according to those affected. Significantly, this localised understanding of normativity does
not presuppose some universal, prescriptive standards that apply across all cases of social
designing; rather, it develops ontologically as negotiated in specific situations.
The proposed definition of social design is novel because, instead of seeking to pre-empt the
nature of the relationship between the social and design - which has been the mainstream
approach until now (see Section 1) - the paper focuses on the terms of engagement and
involvement and the practical judgements of those affected. Thus, it is sensitive to the ‘invivo’ accounts (Vear, 2022; see also Section 1) of design practitioners and how design
process is experienced by those affected, even though the argument is articulated largely
from a philosophical standpoint. Moreover, consistently with the ‘ethos’ of praxis
characterising the in-vivo accounts, the approach proposed has the advantage of eschewing
epistemic reductivism, that is, reducing the thing being defined to some sufficient and
necessary properties that are said to exhaust the thing being defined. Another benefit of the
proposed approach is that the stipulated ontological definition appeals to facts about
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natural human capacities when making normative arguments. It thereby situates normative
argumentation in the broader naturalistic account about human beings and their place in the
world (Dewey, 1938), while at the same time retaining the interpretivist perspective on
human action which sees collective interpretation, deliberative argumentation and
warranting as central human action (Bohman, 2004; Williams, 1981).
Besides, or in virtue of, offering a definition of social design, the proposed approach has the
following implications for social design practice (detailed in Section 4.1):
•

From assuming that the normativity constitutive of social design is empirical, it
follows that social design should be anchored in genuine problems that are
experienced in specific situations.
• From assuming that the normativity constitutive of social design is collectively
warranted, it follows that social design should be conducted in a way that
encourages deliberations and public resolution.
• From assuming that the normativity constitutive of social design is practical, it
follows that social design intervenes into and changes empirical situations in ways
that can be assessed as improvements or deteriorations by those affected.
These implications well be familiar to the practitioners of social design but the paper
grounds these in the overarching argument concerning the nature of social design.
Moreover, it links these points with discussions outside of the design discourse. This crosscutting can advance design practice and design practice research by injecting new
perspectives and establishing dialogues with some well-established approaches outside of
design.
The paper also argues that the definition of social design it offers - and the empirical
entanglement of facts and values it presupposes - gives a good basis for reconceiving
knowledge production more broadly (see Section 4.2). The ontological defining proposed
signals the need to move beyond knowledge as representation to knowledge as acting in
information systems with material consequences (Floridi, 2017) and how this relates to
‘thinking through making’ (Ingold, 2013). This, to borrow a formulation from the context of
science, technology and society, positions knowing firmly as ‘a matter of incommensurable
practical human-cultural ways of being (ontologies), not only of different human
epistemologies or preferred ways of knowing’ (Leach et al., 2005, p. 8).
This positioning of social design can be a good foundation for a number of strands of future
work. These may include reconstructing the norms of collective justification from actual
practices and understanding how normativity is situationally constructed, and in relation to
valuation concerns arising where collective practical judgements are formed out of the
interaction of norms, cognitive claims and feasibility constraints (Helgesson & Muniesa,
2013; Stark, 2009). These concerns have been central to the historic but live efforts of the
pragmatists in the U.S. (e.g., Dewey, 1938) and Europe (e.g., Habermas, 2015) and also
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challenged by the recent perspectives from science and technology studies (Latour, 2004;
Marres, 2007) but never adequately interrogated in the context of design. Nor have they
been understood as central to social design. While a lot more work is needed, the potential
of exploring social design as a normative inquiry should be apparent.
Acknowledgements: This paper has been greatly improved through the peer review
process. I am grateful to the two reviewers for their comments. Above all, I would like to
thank my co-chairs - Eva Knutz and Thomas Markussen of University of Southern
Denmark - for introducing me to some new perspectives in design research which are
now reflected in this paper.
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